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Abstract
Currently, rather secure cryptographic voting protocols
providing verifiability exist. However, without adequate
usability and abstraction concepts to explain the voting
process and, in particular, the verifiability steps, they are
not ready for legally binding elections. This holds in par-
ticular for remote electronic voting systems because of
the absence of poll workers who can support voters by
explaining single steps. In this paper, the usability of the
ballot casting and verifiability procedures of the Helios
open source end to end verifiable remote electronic vot-
ing system is analyzed using the cognitive walkthrough
approach by security, electronic voting and usability ex-
perts. We demonstrate the need for improvements to
the usability and verifiability of Helios, before it is used
in large scale elections outside of an academic context.
Based on our results, we propose new interfaces for im-
proved usability of Helios and future end to end verifi-
able electronic voting systems.
1 Introduction
Past approaches to create trust in electronic voting sys-
tems and in particular in remote electronic voting were
based on system evaluation and certification. Due to neg-
ative criticism of existing electronic voting systems, fu-
ture approaches will additionally be based on the imple-
mentation of verifiability to enable voters, election com-
missions and election observers to verify the integrity of
the election results and thus increase transparency and
trust in the election.
Verifiability is subdivided into individual verifiability
where voters can verify that the ballot is cast as intended
and stored as cast, and universal verifiability where ev-
eryone can verify that the tallying is correct. Systems
providing both types are called E2E (end to end) veri-
fiable. Examples of systems implementing this property
in the context of remote electronic voting are proposed in
[3, 4, 10, 17] and in the context of polling station election
systems in [9, 20].
Many E2E verifiable electronic voting systems have
been proposed in cryptography conferences while only
a few have been implemented and used for real or test
elections. In general, underlying voting protocols are
based on complex cryptographic schemes in order to im-
plement verifiability and to ensure election secrecy at the
same time. In order to verify the electronic election re-
sult, voters need to take additional steps. For instance, to
check that the ballot is stored as cast (individual verifi-
ability), the voter gets an encrypted receipt after having
cast a ballot. Therefore, a major challenge for developers
is to provide a user-friendly and comprehensible inter-
face for ballot casting and processing of verifiability – in
particular for an average voter without any background
in cryptography.
While several E2E verifiable voting protocols exist,
few have been carefully studied in terms of usability for
the end-user. It remains unclear if the voters understand
the verifiability aspect of these systems and whether they
are able to both cast and verify their ballots. This is espe-
cially true in the case of remote electronic voting where
voters cast their ballot alone from their home computers.
With these considerations, the usability of such E2E ver-
ifiable voting systems needs further research. We there-
fore analyzed the Helios remote electronic voting system
described in [3]. It is an open source E2E verifiable vot-
ing system and enables us to implement an improved in-
terface. Moreover, it has already been used for legally
binding elections in academic contexts.
The focus of this paper is the voter’s interaction with
the system and in particular on ballot casting combined
with verifiability mechanisms to verify whether the bal-
lot is cast as intended. Security, electronic voting and us-
ability experts applied the cognitive walkthrough method
to assess this interaction. Based on our results we pro-
pose improvements to the usability of Helios’ interface,
which might also be applicable for other E2E verifiable
electronic voting systems.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In sec-
tion 2 we discuss related work. We introduce Helios and
describe the ballot casting and verifiability processes in
section 3, while in section 4 we discuss the cognitive
walkthrough approach used. We then provide the results
of our usability analysis of the voter interfaces for the
ballot casting procedure including individual verifiabil-
ity in section 5. We propose improvements in section 6,
analyze possible security problems which may be caused
by these recommendations and discuss countermeasures
in section 7 and conclude the paper with a short summary
and presentation of future work in section 8. Screenshots
of the Helios system and our proposed interface improve-
ments are available in Appendix A.
2 Related Work
There is some research that has been undertaken in as-
sessing ballot design (including instructions to the voter)
and its effects on elections (see e.g. [12, 18, 19]). This
research has an indirect effect on the design of interfaces
for electronic voting systems. While this is important to
further improve any voting system, our focus is on ver-
ifiability mechanisms, specifically in remote electronic
voting.
There also exists a series of papers on the usabil-
ity of non-remote electronic voting systems (see e.g.
[5, 11, 14]). However, most of them analyze voting sys-
tems that do not provide verifiability. The few papers
which analyze verifiable electronic voting systems in-
clude e.g. paper audit trails in [1, 15] and ballot scanning
techniques in [7, 8]).
A usability study has already been undertaken on He-
lios version 1.0 by Weber and Hengartner [22]. In their
paper, a mock student government election was created
in order to analyze the usability of Helios. The behav-
ior of 20 voters was observed and a user study including
an interview and a survey conducted. The work shows
two main results: first, half of the participants did not
complete the ballot casting process and gave up before
submitting their vote. There were various reasons for
this outcome, for example script timeout warnings con-
fused voters so that they aborted the voting process. Sec-
ond, most voters did not understand the security features
implemented in the system to ensure integrity either be-
cause of the jargon-laden language used or the lack of
adequate information. For example, the auditing section
did not provide enough information such that only two
out of twenty voters actually verified their ballot.
In this paper we analyze the usability of Helios version
3.1. We take into account the results proposed in [22].
However, we use a different evaluation method namely,
the cognitive walkthrough method, which allows us to
work in an interdisciplinary team and thus identify many
more findings and make suggestions for improvements.
3 Helios Voting System
Based on pre-existing cryptographic and web develop-
ment technologies, the Helios system was designed to
provide an accessible E2E verifiable electronic voting so-
lution. It was implemented and presented by Ben Adida.
Helios is far from being just a research project and an
experimental prototype of a remote electronic voting sys-
tem. Different custom deployments of Helios have been
used in legally binding elections in academic contexts:
the presidential election at the Universitê Catholique de
Louvain in March 2009 [4], the undergraduate student
government at Princeton University in 2009, as well as a
demo election for the International Association of Cryp-
tographic Research (IACR) in 2010 [13]. User guidelines
and videos of Helios as used in the Princeton University
election are available in [2].
In subsection 3.1 we provide some technical informa-
tion explaining Helios’ security features. After this, in
subsection 3.2, we describe the ballot casting process as
well as the steps for individual verifiability.
3.1 Technical Description and Security Is-
sues
Helios is an open-source voting system distributed to
the public under GPL v3 license. Anyone who is will-
ing to test the system can register on the Helios website
and set up an election. The ballot casting application
is implemented as a single-page web application using
JavaScript. In particular, all necessary data is preloaded
into the browser’s memory and the JavaScript code up-
dates the rendered HTML user interface when any links
or buttons are clicked. As a result, no Internet access is
required from the time the data is loaded onto the web
browser, until one is ready to cast their vote. Anyone us-
ing a modern web browser running JavaScript (e.g. Fire-
fox 2 or later), is able to cast a vote.
Ballot preparation and casting including individual
verifiability are based on Benaloh’s Simple Verifiable
Voting Protocol [6], which is based on two aspects - sep-
arating ballot preparation/encryption and ballot casting
as well as on Benaloh’s challenge. The idea of separa-
tion means that the ballot can be viewed, selections can
be made, the ballot can be encrypted and the encryp-
tion can be verified without having to authenticate one-
self and, thus, without being an eligible voter. The voter
only needs to be authenticated for the final ballot casting.
An advantage of this approach is that everyone (includ-
ing election observers) can verify the ballot preparation
mechanism.
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In Benaloh’s challenge, the system commits to the en-
crypted vote and then voters can decide whether they
want to verify or cast the vote. The software cannot fal-
sify information by encrypting the wrong candidate since
it does not know whether the voter will either verify or
cast the encrypted vote. Voters will notice during verifi-
cation if the wrong candidate name is encrypted. In order
to ensure that the software provides the same ciphertext
for verifiability and ballot casting (instead of sending the
properly encrypted vote to the system in case of verifia-
bility and the ciphertext of a wrong candidate in case of
ballot casting), it commits to its encryption by displaying
a hash value of the ciphertext, which is the smart ballot
tracker.
Privacy requirements make it impossible to cast a veri-
fied vote. The verified encrypted vote therefore has to be
re-encrypted. Correspondingly, a new hash value is com-
puted and displayed. Thus, the voter cannot verify the
encrypted vote they finally cast but must trust the system
due to previous checks.
Note that Helios simplifies Benaloh’s protocol with
the consequence that it looses the benefit of coercion-
resistance. As Helios has been designed specifically for
use in elections that do not suffer from high coercion
risks such as student governments, local clubs or online
groups, this is acceptable.
3.2 Voting Procedure
The whole ballot casting and verification procedure from
the voter’s perspective of Helios (3.1) is depicted in Fig-
ure 1 and described below. Note, the corresponding
screenshots of all steps can be found in Appendix A and
are referenced correspondingly.
First, an invitation email containing the URL of the
election page, an election fingerprint, the Voter-ID and
the assigned password is sent to the voter (Figure 7).
The voter clicks on the URL to open the ‘Voting Booth’
web-page which contains instructions on the voting pro-
cedure. After reading the instructions the voter presses
the ‘Start’ button on this page (Figure 8) to invoke a
JavaScript session on their computer. The JavaScript
code will lead the voter through the ballot casting pro-
cedure without a connection to the Internet. An empty
ballot is first displayed (Figure 9). Upon making a selec-
tion, depending on the maximum number of candidates
allowed, the voter gets a warning message pointing to the
limit of the options (Figure 10). To continue the ballot
casting process the voter clicks the ‘Proceed’ button and
is forwarded to a page where all selected candidates are
displayed. The voter can review their selection here, hav-
ing then the chance to change this selection by clicking
the link ‘Update’ or seal the ballot by pressing the but-
ton ‘Confirm Choices and Encrypt Ballot’ (Figure 11).
To continue the process (Figure 12), the voter can ei-
ther submit or verify their encrypted vote by pressing
the ‘Proceed to Cast’ button or the ‘Audit’ link respec-
tively. Note that on this page, the smart ballot tracker is
displayed along with two links to ‘print’ or ‘email’ the
smart ballot tracker. The voter should use either of these
options or record the smart ballot tracker for later verifi-
cation. The voter may also copy and paste this informa-
tion elsewhere.
If the voter opts to verify, and clicks the ‘audit’ link,
the JavaScript then displays a new page with the math-
ematical proofs of the encryption as well as instructions
on how to verify the encrypted vote (Figure 2). The voter
should copy the displayed information, click on the ‘Bal-
lot Verifier’ link and paste the copied information into
the ‘Helios Single-Ballot Verifier’ page which pops up
(Figure 3). On clicking the ‘Verify’ button, they receive
the results at the bottom of the page. As the ‘Helios
Single-Ballot Verifier’ is an independent application with
its own window, the voter can go back to the main ballot
casting application at any time (e.g. by closing the veri-
fication application). In order to continue with the voting
process, the voter clicks the ‘back to voting’ button. Af-
ter that they will need to re-encrypt the ballot. The voter
can then decide whether to cast the encrypted vote or to
verify it again.
If voter clicks the ‘Proceed to Cast’ button they are
forwarded to the login page (Figure 13) where the smart
ballot tracker is displayed again. The voter enters the
Voter-ID and the assigned password from the invitation
email in order to proceed. On pressing the ‘check cre-
dentials’ button, the system confirms eligibility. If they
are authenticated, the voter can in the next step finally
cast the vote (by pressing the ‘I am —, cast this ballot’
button). Alternatively they can click the ‘cancel’ button
and cancel the election (Figure 14). A success message
is displayed once the encrypted vote is successfully cast
(Figure 15). The voter is redirected to the election in-
formation page (Figure 16) by clicking the link ‘return
to election info’. This page contains information on the
election, verifying procedure and provides a link labeled
‘Vote in this election’ for the voter to start the election
process afresh if they so choose. Finally, a confirmation
email is sent to the voter (Figure 17).
4 Cognitive Walkthrough
We applied the cognitive walkthrough technique accord-
ing to [21] in our analysis. This is a usability inspection
technique that uses exploration by experts in the field to
evaluate a design for the ease of its learning. Security,
electronic voting and usability experts inspected the He-
lios user interface by going through a fictitious university
president election and evaluating the understandability
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Figure 1: Ballot Casting and Verification Procedure
of the voting procedure. The group of experts included
one post-doctoral fellow whose research areas include
E-voting and usable security, a usability expert with a
background in psychology, two graduate students, and an
undergraduate computer science student. The usability
expert had no prior exposure or experience with Helios
or verifiable remote electronic voting. The two gradu-
ate students are familiar with HCI concepts. We observe
that the views of the researchers may differ from other
researchers due to the differing voting experiences, for
example between countries in Europe and North Amer-
ica. In our work, the European perspective on electronic
voting is dominant and mostly considered.
During several sessions, each step of the ballot casting
process was carefully considered from the point of view
of the voter, analyzing the steps they would have to fol-
low and the instructions and clues that would help them
along the way. The goal was to capture the functionality
provided to the voter in each step and assess whether the
provided instructions support the voter to decide which
functionality to use and to understand the corresponding
next step.
We considered the voters to be non-computer security
experts and not to have a background in cryptography.
In addition, we assumed that voters are generally more
concerned about the functions of the ballot casting itself,
and act in four steps:
1. Select a task and identify necessary single steps.
2. Explore the product/system and look for the action
which enables the task performance.
3. Select the seemingly most fitting action.
4. Interpret the system response and continue.
To perform the cognitive walkthrough all possible
tasks and single steps were collected and noted down.
For Helios, the tasks were: ‘cast a ballot’ and ‘verify the
ballot’. As an example, the first three steps of the task
‘cast a ballot’ are presented:
1. Read the invitation-to-vote email.
2. Click on the link to access the election website.
3. Press the button ‘Start’ after reviewing the Instruc-
tions.
Overall, the task ‘cast a ballot’ consisted of twelve sin-
gle steps and separately, the task ‘verify the ballot’ con-
sisted of eight steps.
Three questions for each step of each task were then
raised:
1. How do the voters know what to do next and is the
correct answer sufficiently evident to them?
2. Can the voters connect what they are trying to do
with the correct action?
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3. Can the voters see if they have made progress?
These questions in combination with an assessment of
the steps involved in ballot casting and verifiability led
to a collection of challenges that map to the principles of
design in the ISO 9241-210 standard [16]. These prin-
ciples are: suitability for the task, self-descriptiveness,
conformity with user expectations, suitability for learn-
ing, controllability, error tolerance and suitability for in-
dividualization.
We list our findings in section 5 and document recom-
mendations for system improvements in section 6.
5 Results of Analysis
This section presents our analysis of the Helios version
with a closed voter register, that is, a voter needs to
authenticate themselves using login credentials sent via
email. The open voter register of Helios that uses Twit-
ter, Google, Facebook and Yahoo accounts for login was
not considered. We assess the challenges voters would
face and how these challenges affect their ability to cast
a ballot.
Our findings are divided into three categories: general
usability (GUF), verifiability procedure (VPF) and us-
able security (USF) findings. In the first category are the
findings that result from the Helios implementation be-
ing a work in progress. These are easy to correct. Those
in the remaining two categories are more challenging to
resolve as average voters are not used to verifiability and
may not be familiar or comfortable with computer secu-
rity issues.
Under each category, we further present our findings
based on:
• Wording (W): areas where the voter may not under-
stand the terms used (maps to question 1 in section
4);
• Misleading Information (MLI): here the voter is
misled or misinformed by the instructions given
(maps to question 1 in section 4);
• Missing Information (MI): where the voter receives
little or no instructions or explanations (maps to
question 2 in section 4);
• User Interface Elements (UIE): findings relevant to
the design aspects of the Helios user interface (maps
to question 3 in section 4).
The findings are labeled using the abbreviation
<Category>-<Group>.<Number>. A general obser-
vation is that the verifiability steps are very tiring and
complex for the voter, requiring at least eight steps. It
is likely that a voter is unable to verify their ballot or,
worse, does not finish the ballot casting procedure.
5.1 General Usability Findings
We identified two findings in the context of wording
(W), one regarding misleading information (MLI), two
for missing information (MI) and five for usability inter-
face elements (UIE).
GUF-W.1: There are terms used in the ballot casting
process that are technical and unfamiliar to the average
voter, with the result that they are unable to cast their bal-
lot. Examples are the terms ‘fingerprint’ (Figure 7), ‘en-
crypt’ (Figure 8 and Figure 11), ‘audit’ and ‘verify’ (Fig-
ure 12), and ‘trustees’ (Figure 16). This also holds for
whole phrases like ‘encrypted safely inside the browser’
and ‘smart ballot tracker’ (Figure 8) as well as ‘check
credentials’ (Figure 13).
GUF-W.2: There is lack of consistency in the terms
used, e.g. ‘audit’ and ‘verify’ (Figure 12) refer to the
same action. This can be confusing to the voter, causing
them to doubt the reliability of the voting system.
GUF-MLI.1: ASCII characters are used in the pass-
word and the election fingerprint, both provided in the
invitation-to-vote email (Figure 7) as well as in the smart
ballot tracker (Figure 12). Consequently, some letters
look similar for example, ‘I’ and ‘l’ as well as ‘O’ and
‘0’. Generally voters may be confused if they cannot
uniquely identify characters and may be unable to log in
to cast their ballot.
GUF-MI.1: The username and password provided in
the invitation-to-vote email (Figure 7) are only for use
during final vote casting, yet no instructions are pro-
vided to this effect. The voter may expect to be authenti-
cated first, as in other secure applications such as online-
banking and online payments. This lack of conformity to
expectations may lead to confusion and mistrust in He-
lios and interfere with the voter casting their ballot.
GUF-MI.2: In the instructions to voters (Figure 8), no
mention is made whether a voter can deliberately cast
a blank ballot, and no check is carried out to confirm
whether a blank ballot cast by the voter is intentional or
in error. Without a warning message on submission the
voter may use the system incorrectly and cast a blank
ballot unintentionally.
GUF-UIE.1: The step ‘Submit your encrypted ballot’
in the instructions to voters page (Figure 8) encompasses
many more steps than are indicated, such as verifiability.
Furthermore, the navigation buttons in the menu bar at
the top of the web page (e.g. Figure 9) do not inform the
voter how many steps they have left to finish the ballot
casting process. The voter may therefore be surprised
and confused to find more steps are required.
GUF-UIE.2: A ‘Help’ link is provided (Figure 8), but
it is impractical as sending an email may not offer the
voter immediate assistance. They may back out and not
complete the ballot casting process.
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GUF-UIE.3: Features for directing the voter through
the vote casting and verifiability processes differ across
the web pages. For instance, the proceed button is placed
on the right hand side on some web pages (Figure 9),
while on others it appears on the left (Figure 12), the
voter sometimes has to click on a button to proceed while
other times they click on a link for the same function, and
the design of the button on the login page (Figure 13) dif-
fers from other buttons the voter has previously encoun-
tered, e.g. on the candidate selection page (Figure 9).
This may result in the voter getting confused while cast-
ing their ballot, and they may doubt the reliability of the
system. Additionally, the user interface does not easily
direct the voter to the right destination, making interac-
tion with the system difficult. For example, there are no
back buttons for navigation and the browser back button
leads the voter to the very first page and not one step back
as is expected.
GUF-UIE.4: After the voter makes the candidate se-
lection (Figure 10), they are informed that the maximum
number of candidates has been selected. This message is
not necessary and may be confusing to the voter.
GUF-UIE.5: The login page (Figure 13) allows the
voter to authenticate themselves and submit the en-
crypted ballot. The webpage after it (Figure 14) is un-
necessary, as the voter should not need to click yet again
on a button to submit their ballot. The voter may be con-
fused as they expect that the ballot will be cast as soon as
they log in successfully.
5.2 Verifiability Procedure Findings
We identified two findings in the context of wording
(W), six regarding misleading information (MLI), ten for
missing information (MI) and five for usability interface
elements (UIE).
VPF-W.1: There is the use of unfamiliar terms and
lack of precise explanations to describe the verifiability
process (Figure 12). As a result voters may not be able to
either verify the ballot or finish the ballot casting process.
VPF-W.2: Diverse information is displayed in the ver-
ification results (Figure 3). First, the election fingerprint
and the ballot fingerprint are displayed with the message
‘election fingerprint matches the ballot’, which could be
incomprehensible to the voter, as it is unclear what in par-
ticular should be matching. Second, the ballot content is
displayed as well as the message ‘Encryption Verified’,
and ‘Proofs ok’. The voter may not understand this out-
put. Furthermore, the message ‘Proofs ok’ does not mean
that a manipulation has not taken place. This is only the
case if the ballot fingerprint and the ballot content are
verified by the voter. This could result in the voter ac-
cepting this result and not going on to compare the smart
ballot tracker.
VPF-MLI.1: The smart ballot tracker is displayed
when the voter is prompted to log in to cast their vote
(Figure 13), yet it neither provides any advantages for se-
curity nor improves the level of verifiability at this stage.
This may result in the voter ignoring the information, dis-
regarding information necessary for verifiability.
VPF-MLI.2: On clicking ‘Audit’ (Figure 12), the voter
is given a lot of information which contains terms they
may not understand, e.g. ‘...reveal how your choices
were encrypted’ and ‘re-encrypt’. No indication is given
what happens after verification. Further, the voter is
given instructions using phrases that may be unclear.
They are informed that they will be guided to re-encrypt
their choices for ‘final casting’, but this choice of phras-
ing may unintentionally influence the voter to only audit
the ballot once.
VPF-MLI.3: The voter accesses the auditing webpage
(Figure 2), and notes that it bears the title message ‘Your
audited ballot’, this before the voter has carried out the
verifiability process. This can cause the voter to think
that their ballot is automatically audited, and so they do
not go ahead to audit it. Second, the instruction ‘... to
cast a ballot, you must...’ may cause the voter to verify
the ballot only once.
Figure 2: Voting Booth - Audited Ballot
VPF-MLI.4: On choosing to verify the encryption
(Figure 12), the voter is directed to the verification page
(Figure 2) where the ballot information is presented as
a long mysterious string. They may find this string too
long and not make the comparison, thereby not verifying
the correctness of the ballot.
VPF-MLI.5: After successful verification (Figure 3)
the voter may be misled to think that they have success-
fully cast their ballot since there is no information re-
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minding them to do so. This may result in the voter not
verifying or casting their ballot.
VPF-MLI.6: In the verification results page (Figure 3),
the voter’s candidate selection is displayed in clear text.
The voter may have fears regarding their privacy in that
the verifier is aware of their vote and may not proceed to
cast their ballot.
Figure 3: Verification Results
VPF-MI.1: There are no instructions given to the voter
(Figure 8) regarding verifiability although this feature is
provided by the system. A lack of information may cause
the voter to get confused later in the voting process or
ignore the verification steps as they have not been made
aware of them.
VPF-MI.2: A smart ballot tracker is given after the en-
cryption of the ballot (Figure 12) and appears in several
other webpages (Figures 13, 14 and 15), yet the impor-
tance and purpose of this information is not indicated,
and as a result the voter may ignore it. The ballot finger-
print itself is long and the voter may not be motivated to
either copy it or write it down, or makes errors when they
do so.
VPF-MI.3: The voter is instructed to keep a record of
the smart ballot tracker with the option to note it down,
print it or email it (Figure 12). However, they may not
understand the significance of this action and may ignore
information important for verifiability.
VPF-MI.4: The action of the voter auditing their ballot
(Figure 12) and the importance of this step is not empha-
sized. There is a high likelihood that the voter may ig-
nore it and complete the voting process without verifying
their vote.
VPF-MI.5: The voter is informed that their audited
ballot will not be tallied (Figure 2). No explanation is
given why this is the case. The voter may be deterred
from continuing with the process.
VPF-MI.6: The voter is instructed to post the audited
ballot to the tracking center (Figure 2), yet neither is in-
formation given why they should do this, nor the purpose
and location of the tracking center indicated. The voter
may ignore this step although it is important for verifia-
bility.
VPF-MI.7: The voter is not directed to compare the
election fingerprint (Figure 3) and the fingerprint re-
ceived in the invitation-to-vote email (Figure 7), with the
result that they might not know what to do and therefore
ignore this information.
VPF-MI.8: Without instructions on the purpose and
function of the smart ballot tracker displayed in the veri-
fiability results (Figure 3), the voter may also ignore it.
VPF-MI.9: If the voter is dissatisfied with the results
of the verifiability procedure (Figure 3), there is no in-
formation provided on how they can proceed and there is
no possibility to contact the election authorities to file a
complaint. This lack of support may disillusion voters,
who may decide not to continue casting their ballot.
VPF-MI.10: After casting their ballot, the voter is in-
formed that they have done so successfully (Figure 15).
This however may cause the voter to trust the results pre-
maturely and not verify the results.
VPF-UIE.1: It is unclear what the link ‘Select your
ballot audit info’ (Figure 2) does. The voter may miss
some steps or assume that the information is copied into
the verifier automatically, which is not the case.
VPF-UIE.2: On clicking the link ‘ballot verifier’ (Fig-
ure 2), a new window pops up displaying an empty box
with the heading ‘Your Ballot’. However there is no ver-
ified ballot information displayed and the voter can make
an error here in the absence of the required guidelines.
VPF-UIE.3: After verification the voter may not know
how to continue with the ballot casting process, and how
to move between the two pages (Figure 3 and Figure 11).
This is because there is no link, button or text explain-
ing how to either continue or terminate the process. The
voter would therefore back out of the voting process.
VPF-UIE.4: The verification results webpage (Fig-
ure 3) contains an election URL which the voter can edit,
but whose purpose is not stated. The voter may as a result
be uncertain how to proceed.
VPF-UIE.5: The fact that the verifier (Figure 3) has
the same interface design as the voting system is likely
to evoke doubts in the voter as the ballot will be verified
by the same system used to cast it.
5.3 Usable Security Findings
We identified two findings in the context of misleading
information (MLI) and one finding regarding missing in-
formation (MI).
USF-MLI.1: After successfully encrypting their bal-
lot, the voter is given information regarding protecting
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their privacy (Figure 12), that is, they will log in only
once the ballot is encrypted. The voter may not under-
stand the difference and expect to be authenticated prior
to interacting with the system. Second, the voter is in-
formed that the system will only remember the encrypted
vote, but if the JavaScript is manipulated it can display
this message and yet go on to record the voter’s identity.
USF-MLI.2: No means of authenticating the identity
of the election server is provided, for example, a finger-
print of the server certificate. The consequence is that
these issues may cause distrust since they are not ad-
dressed, and the voter may not go ahead to cast their bal-
lot. As an example: phishing emails could be distributed
with faked links to manipulated web pages.
USF-MI.1: In the invitation-to-vote email (Figure 7)
the voter receives their password in cleartext with no en-
cryption applied. This is a security threat that can be ex-
ploited, thereby causing the voter to question the security
of the voting system.
Note: some of the findings presented here were noted
as challenges in the UCL elections [4] and the IACR
demo election [13], for example, GUF-W.1, GUF-W.2,
GUF-MLI.1, GUF-MI.2 and VPF-W.1. A few were ad-
dressed for example: in the UCL election, a service desk
number was availed at the bottom of the voting interface.
6 Recommendations For An Improved In-
terface
In total we identified ten general usability findings, 23
verifiability procedure findings and three usable security
findings. In this section we present our proposed im-
provements to Helios in order to enhance its comprehen-
sibility and usability, particularly the usability of verifia-
bility. We refer to the findings made in section 5.
Our improvements are categorized as follows:
• the different setting we use, i.e., a fictitious univer-
sity president election run at our university on our
own servers, (under subsection 6.1)
• main improvements to the interface and ballot cast-
ing and verifiability process, (under subsection 6.2)
• minor changes, such as wording, (under subsection
6.3).
We have developed a prototype to demonstrate the pro-
posed improvements and plan to run a user study in the
near future. The improvements were made to meet the
comprehensibility, usability and verifiability challenges
in Helios. Due to these changes, a new voting process
is necessary and can be seen in Figure 4. Screenshots of
the new interface are available in Appendix A.
6.1 Different Setting
In the proposed process we use postal mail to send letters
containing login credentials to individual voters (Fig-
ure 18). The electorate in this environment are familiar
with postal voting and may be comfortable with this. In
preparing the password, we propose that it be encoded in
a font that clearly distinguishes the different characters.
An alternative is to leave out the problem characters to
avoid confusing the voters (GUF-MLI.1).
If the voter is unable to successfully complete the ver-
ifiability process, rather than writing an email, they can
immediately contact the election authorities (Figure 5)
using a hotline with 24-hour service. This telephone
number is displayed on the web page (GUF-UIE.2; VPF-
MI.9). Implementation of this 24-hour hotline can inte-
grate both human and machine support to improve feasi-
bility.
We propose that the verifiability process is handled
by independent parties in order to enhance the trust a
voter has in the results of the verifiability as seen in
Figure 5. The voter is free to select which party they
want to verify their vote. They no longer have to copy
and paste the ballot information, thereby reducing the
chance of errors. Once the ballot is verified, the voter
is only given relevant and simple information as feed-
back. Additionally, we provide the option for a voter
to manually verify their ballot is correctly encrypted
(VPF-W.2; VPF-MLI.3; VPF-MLI.5; VPF-MLI.7; VPF-
UIE.2; USF-UIE.1; VPF-UIE.5). Having several inde-
pendent institutions to verify the voter’s ballot, as well
as allowing the voter to select any of the institutions pro-
vided, adds greater credibility to the verified results. Use
of multiple institutions will minimize the possibility of
collusion between a corrupt auditing institution and a
manipulated JavaScript. Note: The criteria used to se-
lect these institutions depend on the election in question.
Since in our setup only one election is run at a given
time and on only a single server, the election fingerprint
is not necessary in identifying the election (Figure 19)
and is therefore removed (VPF-UIE.4). As such, the
voter no longer has to compare the fingerprint informa-
tion (VPF-MI.7).
We propose use of three distinct websites, namely
www.election.university.org (Figure 19) with informa-
tion on the election, www.votecasting.university.org
(Figure 20) for the actual ballot casting and
www.electionresults.university.org (Figure 27), where
election results and information for verifiability will
be posted. This will enhance usability for the voter
as they have one web page per action; one for general
information, one to cast their ballot and one to verify if
their vote appears on the bulletin board.
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Figure 4: Improved Ballot Casting and Verification Procedure
6.2 Main Improvements
Since the verification-code used in the original version
is too long, we have shortened it, making it less intimi-
dating and more usable for the voter (Figure 23). How-
ever, identifying an appropriate length remains work in
progress. The verification-code can be shortened as a
collision is only relevant for four days (duration of the
election). Finding a collision after this is not useful. We
have also avoided using characters that are likely to be
difficult to distinguish (VPF-MLI.1; VPF-MI.3).
In Figure 18 we provide a fingerprint of the SSL cer-
tificate of the election server at the back of the invitation-
to-vote letter (USF-MI.1).
The verification process has been made more user-
friendly. The voter no longer has to select and copy the
ballot audit information as can be seen in Figure 6 (VPF-
UIE.1). The option for self-verification of ballot infor-
mation is retained.
We integrate an additional step ‘verification-code’ in
the menu bar (Figure 19) to adequately inform the voter
of all the steps that will be carried out, and also to draw
attention to the verifiability process (GUF-UIE.1).
The interface has been redesigned to be consistent,
with each webpage providing forward and back buttons
(Figure 20) enabling the voter to easily proceed with the
ballot casting process. There is also consistency with re-
gards to the terminology used (GUF-UIE.3).
The voter’s ballot is immediately sent to and stored
at the server upon successful authentication (Figure 26)
and a simple confirmation message is displayed (GUF-
UIE.5; VPF-MI.10).
We aim to maintain consistency such that one word
has the same meaning throughout the whole process. In
addition we have used terms that are familiar to voters
(Figure 19), e.g. we have renamed the ‘smart ballot
tracker’ to ‘verification-code’ (Figure 23), a term more
understandable to the voters (GUF-W.1; GUF-W.2). The
aspect of wording familiar to voters will later be analysed
in a user study.
The improved interface gives adequate explanation in
areas where voters might be confused, for example what
they should do with the verification-code after successful
ballot encryption in Figure 23 (VPF-W.1; VPF-MLI.2;
VPF-MLI.3) The explanations hold in particular for the
verification steps: In Figure 6 the voter is given clear in-
structions how to proceed with ballot-casting after veri-
fication (VPF-MLI.6; VPF-UIE.3). The instructions to
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Figure 5: Improved System - Verification Institutes
the voter are deliberately simple and clear in order to
give them adequate support to complete the voting pro-
cess (VPF-MI.1). The need for verification (Figure 23)
is explained to the voter using terms that they can under-
stand (VPF-MI.2; VPF-MI.4; VPF-MI.5).
The ballot tracking center is no longer incorporated
in the new interface. The voter can check for their
verification-code by accessing the bulletin board (Fig-
ure 27) after the end of the election (VPF-MI.4; VPF-
MI.6). This verification at the end of the election is nec-
essary as the voter can detect if their ballot has been
modified. They would do this by checking that the
verification-code posted on the bulletin board matches
what they received during vote casting. The information
on this website would be availed in the invitation-to-vote
email.
We inform the voter that they will only be authenti-
cated at the end after selecting their candidate, and in the
instructions to voters (Figure 19) we give explanations
for this difference from what the voter may be familiar
with (GUF-MI.1). In addition, before the voter logs in to
cast a ballot we inform them (Figure 25) where to obtain
their username and password voting credentials, which
were sent earlier in the invitation-to-vote letter (USF-
MLI.2).
In the improved screenshots, the option to cast a blank
ballot is made clearly visible to the voter. If they make
this selection, a message is displayed to inform them that
Figure 6: Improved System - Verification Result
they will cast an invalid vote (GUF-MI.2). For an exam-
ple, see Figure 20.
In order to ensure that the voter knows what to do with
the verification-code, we remind them to compare the
value given at one stage to that obtained in an earlier one
(VPF-MLI.1; VPF-MI.8). See for example Figure 25.
6.3 Minor Changes
While making a candidate selection (Figure 20), the
voter is informed that they can only select one candi-
date. The word ‘one’ is highlighted in order to catch
the voter’s attention. Once the voter has made their se-
lection, they are instructed to proceed to encrypt the vote
(GUF-UIE.4).
In Figure 19 we do not mention the aspect of protect-
ing the voter’s privacy in the instructions to the voters
since it is likely to be confusing (USF-MLI.1).
All the findings indicated earlier in section 5 have been
discussed in this section and matched with proposed im-
provements. Those not dealt with require further re-
search and are considered future work.
7 Security analysis of the Proposed Modi-
fications
We have proposed and implemented in a prototype sev-
eral improvements to the Helios interface and ballot cast-
ing and verifiability process. Here we briefly review the
security of Helios given the proposed modifications.
• We have proposed use of a shortened verification-
code in order to improve the usability. The chances
of an attacker finding a collusion are higher, how-
ever they would have a limited amount of time
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(from the start of the election when public key pa-
rameters are released, to the close of the election
period) in which to do this. The exact amount of
time depends on the election and the time available
for vote casting and correspondingly the size of the
verification-code depends on this. The exact length
that provides an acceptable amount of security and
usability requires further research.
• When the voter is ready to verify their ballot, the
ballot information is forwarded directly to the insti-
tution selected. This will require Internet connec-
tivity earlier in the ballot casting process. Besides
this, one might argue that in our proposed version, a
manipulated JavaScript would send modified verifi-
ability information to the institutions. This is true,
however, in the current Helios version a manipu-
lated JavaScript would behave in a similiar way:
it simply displays modified verification information
to the voter (to copy and paste this to the exter-
nal verification service). In both versions, this can
only be detected if a voter stores and compares their
verification-code.
• After the voter logs in to cast their ballot, the en-
crypted ballot is immediately captured and the voter
is given feedback to this effect. This is done to
reduce the number of single steps the voter has to
carry out to complete a task. If any modifications
are made to the ballot at this stage, the voter will
detect this when they access the bulletin board at
the end of the election.
No major modifications have been made related to se-
curity other than shortening the fingerprint, which has
been done to improve the usability of the verification-
code. Thus the security is not reduced either in practice
or in theory by the shortened fingerprint.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
E2E verifiable electronic voting systems are the most
promising approaches to enable electronic voting and in
particular remote electronic voting. While a large num-
ber of cryptographic protocols have been proposed in
conferences, only few protocols for E2E verifiable re-
mote electronic voting have been implemented and used
for legally binding elections and only in academic con-
texts. The Helios voting system is one of the exceptions.
Its implementation is a first step in the right direction
from theoretical approaches to practical solutions. So far
the focus has mainly been on security issues of Helios
and less on the usability shortcomings of Helios and ver-
ifiable electronic voting schemes in general.
In this paper we used the cognitive walkthrough ap-
proach to analyze the usability of the Helios voting sys-
tem, specifically the usability of the verifiability process.
We have proposed an improved interface corresponding
to the findings made. There still exist, in the latest ver-
sion of Helios, a number of usability flaws in the gen-
eral design of the voter interface (like a mix of links
and buttons, inconsistent wording, no back buttons pro-
vided e.t.c). Also, the functionality of individual verifia-
bility and the re-encryption/modified commitments after
the verifiability has been carried out are too complicated,
time intensive and error-prone. The consequence of these
flaws and complexity is that very few voters can make
use of the verifiability. Even with the note that not all
voters have to verify, a requirement of the equal election
principle is that all voters have the same opportunities
and can all verify.
More research is needed to find out how many people
verify their ballot in elections run with the Helios vot-
ing system. The prototype developed will be used to run
several user tests to improve it further. Furthermore, we
plan to carry out a user study using the improved inter-
faces to determine what terms voters are more familiar or
comfortable with, for instance between ‘audit’ and ‘ver-
ify’ and the effect of renaming ‘smart ballot tracker’ to
‘verification-code’. This user study will also test if in
general average voters opt to verify their ballot using the
new interfaces and how to get them to use it. In addition,
the user study will help determine which institutions are
known and trusted by the voter to carry out the verifiabil-
ity process. Cultural issues and background will be taken
into account in selecting participants for the user study.
This is because these are likely to be factors affecting the
participants’ perception of the voting interfaces. Finally,
the effect of shortening the verification-code on the se-
curity of Helios requires further investigation regarding
which length is appropriate for which election and vote
casting timeframe as well as the possibility of using QR
(quick response) codes.
We plan to cooperate with the developers of Helios
to have these improvements integrated in the official ver-
sion. As we concentrated in this paper only on the voter’s
side and only on the first part of the individual verifiabil-
ity, the next steps will consist of a usability analysis of
the remaining voter interfaces and the interfaces for the
election commission.
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A Screenshots
Figure 7: Invitation-to-Vote Email
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Figure 8: Voting Booth - Information Page Figure 9: Voting Booth - Empty Ballot
Figure 10: Voting Booth - Ballot with a Selection Figure 11: Voting Booth - Review the Ballot
Figure 12: Voting Booth - Smart Ballot Tracker and Audit
Option Figure 13: Voting Booth - Authentication
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Figure 14: Voting Booth - Last Check before Casting Figure 15: Voting Booth - Confirmation Message
Figure 16: Election Information Page Figure 17: Confirmation Email
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Figure 18: Improved System: Invitation-to-Vote Letter Figure 19: Improved System: Election Information Page
Figure 20: Improved System: Empty Ballot Figure 21: Improved System: Invalid Vote
Figure 22: Improved System: Ballot with a Selection
Figure 23: Improved System: Verification-Code and Ver-
ify Option
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Figure 24: Improved System: New Verification-Code Figure 25: Improved System: Authentication
Figure 26: Improved System: Confirmation Message Figure 27: Improved System: Bulletin Board
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